Abstract. This paper studies a model of interpersonal bundling, in which a monopolist o¤ers a good for sale under a regular price and a group purchase discount if the number of consumers in a group-the bundle size-belongs to some menu of intervals. We …nd that this is often a pro…table selling strategy in response to demand uncertainty, and it can achieve the highest pro…t among all possible selling mechanisms. We explain how the pro…tability of interpersonal bundling with a minimum or maximum group size may depend on the nature of uncertainty and on parameters of the market environment, and discuss strategic issues related to the optimal design and implementation of these bundling schemes. Our analysis sheds light on popular marketing practices such as group purchase discounts, and o¤ers insights on potential new marketing innovation.
INTRODUCTION
This paper studies a form of product bundling where a good is o¤ered for sale under both a regular price and a group purchase discount if the group size-the bundle sizemeets certain requirement. The de…ning characteristic of this selling format is that the purchase of the bundle is made by di¤erent consumers-and hence we term it interpersonal bundling-rather than by a single consumer as under traditional mixed bundling. 1 Interpersonal bundling (denoted as IB) is a widely observed selling practice. In many markets and for many goods, multiple consumers may form a purchase group to qualify for a group discount, as, for example, when buying tickets for a concert, purchasing a tour, or dining at a restaurant. 2 In recent years, many Internet sites have emerged that allow sellers to o¤er IB, where consumers purchasing with group coupons receive substantial discounts when the minimum group size is reached. Launched in November 2008, Groupon was a pioneer in this selling format on the Internet, and it exceeded a billion dollars in revenue in just its third year of operation (Levin, 2012) . 3 Despite its popularity, the pricing and pro…tability of interpersonal bundling have not been studied in a general framework that allows a menu of bundle sizes. How should a seller optimally choose prices and bundle sizes?
When will IB be more pro…table than separate selling? 4 What determine the magnitude of its pro…t advantage? We provide some answers to these questions in this study. 1 Mixed bundling refers to o¤ering goods for sale both as a package and as individual components. 2 Miller Farms, a local family farm in Colorado, runs the Fall Harvest Festival each year. In 2012, a customer is charged $15 to participate in the Festival and pick up vegetables to take home. For a group of 10 or more, the price per person is lowered to $13. 3 Many other group buying websites o¤er variants of interpersonal bundling, including Livingsocial, where a consumer receives a free deal if she gets three people buy the product. There are numerous interpersonal bundling sites around the global, such as uBuyiBuy, Gaopeng, and Lashou in Asia, MyCityDeal in Europe, Downtown Colombia in South America, and Spreets in Australia. 4 Here, separate selling means o¤ering a good for sale under a single unit price to all consumers, whereas a pure bundle would consist of multiple units of the same good under a unit price for group purchase.
The recent economics literature has investigated product bundling that is di¤erent from traditional mixed bundling. See, for example, the study of bundle size pricing by Chu, Leslie, and Sorensen (2011), and of inter-…rm bundling by Gans and King (2006) and Armstrong (2012) .
The literature on product bundling has found that mixed bundling often is more pro…table than separate selling through two main mechanisms: segmenting the consumer population to facilitate price discrimination and reducing the dispersion of consumer values to extract consumer surplus (e.g., Adams and Yellen 1976; Schmalensee, 1984; Long, 1984 ; McAfee,
McMillan, and Whinston 1989; and Chen and Riordan, 2013). 5 This paper will explore an alternative motive for bundling: as a pro…table strategy in response to demand uncertainty.
While this motive can also arise when each bundle is purchased by an individual consumer, 6 it is especially relevant and important for interpersonal bundling.
We consider a stylized model where a monopolist sells to a population of low-and highvalue consumers, with the numbers of these consumers being uncertain and following some joint probability distribution. Under separate selling, the seller would ideally pursue a highprice strategy if high-value consumers is numerous, or a low-price strategy that will also attract low-value consumers if their number is su¢ ciently large. However, because price is set before the uncertainty is resolved, a single price is generally not optimal. By o¤ering the good for sale under IB, it is possible that a high or low price will become e¤ective only when that price is optimal under the demand realization. Thus, interpersonal bundling potentially enables the seller to use optimal option pricing under uncertain demand, leading to higher pro…t than separate selling.
Our analysis of this model, in a general setting where the seller can commit to a menu that speci…es multiple bundle size intervals to which the group discount applies, leads to two results. First, we show that a bundle menu with at most two (disjoint) intervals is more pro…table than separate selling, provided that demand uncertainty is relevant for the choice of optimal prices under separate selling. Second, under a plausible su¢ cient condition, IB 5 In a standard model of two goods, some consumers may value one good highly but another very little, while others may value two goods together relatively highly, and values for the bundle may be less dispersed than values for individual goods. By charging the former (who purchase only a single unit) a higher price and the latter a bundle discount, mixed bundling generally leads to higher pro…t than separate selling. 6 Under standard mixed bundling with two goods, there can be uncertainties on each individual consumer's valuation for the two goods, and mixed bundling can thus be viewed as a form of option pricing, where a consumer will obtain the bundle discount only if she has su¢ ciently high demand for both goods.
achieves the highest pro…t among all possible selling mechanisms. Both results are obtained without assuming functional forms on the joint distribution of consumer numbers, and they provide a general and elegant characterization of the properties of interpersonal bundling.
To gain insights on when the general conditions on the pro…tability of IB are satis…ed and how to implement IB in various market environments, we further study two especially simple forms of IB: interpersonal bundling with a minimum or maximum group size, denoted respectively as IBmin or IBmax. For each of them, we derive a su¢ cient condition for its superiority over separate selling. Interestingly, these two conditions, both invariant to the functional form of the consumer distributions, reveal contrasting patterns of demand uncertainty. Speci…cally, relative to separate selling, IBmin tends to be more pro…table when the number of low-value consumers is more dispersed, whereas IBmax tends to be more pro…table when the number of high-value consumers is more dispersed. On the other hand, their pro…tability is also a¤ected by some other aspects of the market environment in similar ways. We illuminate the intuition behind these …ndings, relate them to observed marketing practices, and suggest that IBmax, as a potentially pro…table marketing innovation, can be implemented similarly as IBmin on the Internet and through intermediaries such as Groupon and Amazon.
We further explore how a seller may incorporate additional strategic considerations in the design of IBmin, by explicitly modeling the decision process of individual consumers in two variants of the main model. In the …rst variant, we allow the possibility that some consumers are initially uninformed about the existence of the seller's product. Then, in order to qualify for the group discount, informed consumers may take (costly) actions to transmit product information to the uninformed, and the seller can exploit this incentive in setting the bundle size. IBmin can thus increase the seller's pro…t by facilitating the dissemination of product information. 7 In the second variant, we consider the possibility that high-value consumers need to incur transaction costs to sign up for group purchase. The seller may then partially segment the consumer population, charging the regular price to high-value consumers with high sign-up costs while attracting low-value consumers with the bundle discount. To allow for a richer modeling of consumers' decision process, we consider two forms of IBmin in a two-period setting: a simultaneous format where the seller does not inform period-2 consumers how many buyers signed up in period 1, and a sequential format where the seller does. Hu, Shi and Wu (2013) …nd in a parallel setting that the seller prefers the sequential mechanism, because it encourages consumer participation by removing their uncertainty in period 2, which leads to higher group formation rates. Interestingly, in our case the seller, who aims to maximize pro…t, may instead prefer the simultaneous format. This is because the simultaneous format does not remove uncertainty to the high-value consumers, which facilitates price discrimination by discouraging them from obtaining the bundle discount.
In addition to o¤ering a new perspective on product bundling, this paper is also closely related to the literature on pricing under demand uncertainty. In Dana (1999 Dana ( , 2001 ), for example, demand can be either high or low. He …nds that a monopolist optimally o¤ers two prices, with only a limited quantity o¤ered under a low price, which is set for the low demand state. A high price then allows the …rm to extract additional consumer surplus when demand turns out to be high, in which case the limited quantity available at the low price will sell out so that some high-priced units will be purchased. Anand and Aron (2003) , in an early study of web-based group buying, also consider a model with either a high or a low demand regime, represented by two linear demand functions. They demonstrate that group buying may enable the seller to set price-quantity schedules that optimize revenue under each demand regime, and that the pro…tability of group buying relative to posted pricing depends on whether the two linear demand functions are parallel or intersecting. 8 Our paper departs from this literature by adopting a di¤erent analytical approach, capturing the group 8 Also related are Holmes (1992, 1993) , who study how a monopolist may use advance purchase discounts to allocate capacity more e¢ ciently in the presence of demand uncertainty. See also Dana (1998) for a related analysis in competitive markets.
buying problem in a general bundling framework. One clear advantage of this approach is
that it enables us to analyze group-discount schemes with minimum or maximum group sizes in a uni…ed model and to uncover the interesting relations between them. Additionally, we are concerned with the uncertainty of a di¤erent nature: there are both high-and lowvalue consumers, and the uncertainty is over their respective numbers. We believe that this captures plausible market environments faced by many …rms, complementary to the settings studied in other papers in this literature. Furthermore, our analysis leads to interesting new results on the pro…tability and optimal design of interpersonal bundling. Our paper thus contributes to the literatures on product bundling, on pricing under demand uncertainty, and, more generally, on the economics and management of marketing.
In the rest of the paper, we establish the two general properties of interpersonal bundling
in section 2, and analyze in more detail its two simple forms, IBmin and IBmax, in section 3. Section 4 explores the optimal design of IBmin incorporating additional strategic considerations of information dissemination and price discrimination. Section 5 concludes.
DEMAND UNCERTAINTY AND INTERPERSONAL BUNDLING

The Model
A monopolist o¤ers a product for sale. There are two types of consumers, high-value and low-value, whose product valuations are respectively H and L; with H > L > 0: A consumer's type is her private information, and each consumer desires to purchase at most one unit. The numbers of low-and high-value consumers (denoted as L-consumers and respectively: Production cost is normalized to zero, and the …rm maximizes expected pro…t.
Let x and y be the expected number of L-and H-consumers, respectively. Then
We allow the possibility that either y = y is a constant or x = x is a constant; in which case G (x; y) degenerates to F x (x) or F y (y) : 9
As a benchmark, consider the case of separate selling where the …rm posts a single unit price to all consumers. Then, pro…t is higher under p = H if H y > L ( x + y) and under
It follows that the optimal price and the corresponding pro…t are, respectively: 10
Therefore, if the expected number of L-consumers ( x) is small, the …rm will only sell to the H-consumers at p s = H; otherwise, it will sell to all consumers at p s = L.
Under interpersonal bundling (IB), the …rm sets a stand-alone unit price p; a discounted unit price under group purchase q p; and a condition that the group discount becomes ef- purchase, which implies that if q < p, all consumers will attempt to purchase at q.
Pro…tability of Interpersonal Bundling
We …rst demonstrate that a simple form of IB, with p = H; q = L; and some B containing at most two intervals; is generally more pro…table than separate selling under demand uncertainty.
Given (p; q; B) ; all consumers will purchase at price q if x + y 2 B and q L; whereas when x + y 2 B only H-consumers will purchase at price p if L < p H; where B is the complement of set B: The …rm's problem is to maximize (expected) pro…t:
Since (p; q; B) weakly increases in p and q for any B; the optimal p and q that maximize The seller's problem can be written as maximizing
Our result below will assume a regularity condition on uncertainty: there exist (small) 
That is, conditional on x+y belonging to 1 ; x+y > H L y; and conditional on x+y belonging to 2 ; x + y < H L y: This assumption rules out trivial cases where x + y is always higher or lower than H L y for (almost) all possible realizations of (x; y) ; in which case under separate selling the optimal price will be independent of the realization of (x; y) : As it will become clear later, condition (5) holds quite generally; in fact, if it is not satis…ed, then separate selling will always be an optimal selling scheme (see the argument immediately following (14) in the next subsection), and the resolution of demand uncertainty will not a¤ect the choice of p s .
Proposition 1 Under (5), interpersonal bundling (H; L; B 0 ) ; with B 0 containing at most two intervals, is more pro…table than separate selling.
Proof. Since under separate selling s = max fH y; L ( x + y)g ; we show that there is some (The …rst inequality above is due to revealed preference, and the second to the de…nition of 1 ; which is a single interval and could be a single number if it is a mass point.)
Next, suppose instead that s = L ( x + y) : Then, let B 0 = 2 ; which contains two intervals, with B 0 = 2 : We then have
The reason for the pro…tability of IB is simple. With uncertain demand, the optimal uniform price depends on the realization of the numbers of H-and L-consumers. Under separate selling, the …rm chooses the price that is only optimal on average.
the L-consumers are not served, and adding a discounted price L that becomes e¤ective only if the realized consumer group size corresponds to a region where p s = L; which is ensured by the construction of bundle B 0 , leads to a higher expected pro…t than separate selling under p s = H: Similarly, when p s = L; pro…t can be increased by also o¤ering a higher regular price H that becomes e¤ective only if the realized consumer group size corresponds to a region where pro…t is higher under p s = H: Thus, IB implements pro…table option pricing under demand uncertainty, boosting pro…t.
Notice that for IB to dominate separate selling with p s = H, the bundle size is only required to satisfy x + y 2 1 ; i.e., m x + y M for some m M ; and for IB to dominate p s = L, the bundle size is only required to satisfy x + y 2 2 ; i.e., x + y m or x + y M for some m M: Therefore a pro…table bundle B 0 contains at most two intervals. However, B 0 may not be the optimal bundle. IB with a more general B can potentially achieve higher pro…t. In fact, as we show next, IB with a general bundle menu B is an optimal selling scheme if a plausible su¢ cient condition is satis…ed.
Interpersonal Bundling as an Optimal Selling Mechanism
This subsection demonstrates that IB (H; L; B ) ; with B = f[m i ; M i ] : i = 1; :::; ng ; is an optimal selling mechanism under the following su¢ cient condition (explained shortly):
where
We prove this by …rst characterizing the seller's highest possible pro…t under its information constraint, using a general mechanism design approach. We then show that optimal IB achieves this (constrained) …rst best under (6).
Since all consumers are ex ante the same, we can consider mechanisms for a representative consumer. From the revelation principle, we can limit our search for an optimal selling scheme to direct mechanisms where the consumer is asked to report her type 2 fH; Lg ; who will receive a unit of the good with probability ( ) by paying p ( ) ; 12 and truth reporting is optimal for the consumer. Given that there is a continuum of consumers, ( ) and p ( ) will depend on and on some aggregate measure(s) of consumers. For the …rst best, we assume that a mechanism may depend on the realized total demand from each of the two types of consumers, x and y: 13 Then, a mechanism speci…es f ( ; x; y) ; p ( ; x; y)g :
The seller chooses f ( ; x; y) ; p ( ; x; y)g to maximize
subject to individual rationality constraints
and incentive compatibility constraints
From standard arguments, p (L; x; y) = L so that the L-type receives no information rents, and (10) holds with p (H; x; y) L: From (11), which holds in equality at the optimum, and with p (L; x; y) = L; we have
Thus (9) and (12) are the two remaining constraints. Substituting (12) into (7), with
We can also allow a transfer payment when the consumer does not receive the good, but it would be optimal for the seller to set this payment to zero. 1 3 In reality, the seller may only be able to commit to prices based on aggregate demand x + y; but not on individual values of x and y; because x and y may not be separately veri…able while x + y potentially is.
Thus the …rst-best pro…t is only a benchmark. Remarkably, as we show next, IB can achieve this …rst best if (6) holds.
which increases in (H; x; y) : Since constraint (9) is not less likely satis…ed with an increase in ; it follows that (H; x; y) = 1 at the optimum. Then, (9) and (12) become H p (H; x; y) = H (H L) (L; x; y) ; and the seller chooses (L; x; y) to maximize
which can be written as
Therefore, letting (L; x; y) = 1 whenever x + y > H L y and (L; x; y) = 0 whenever x + y H L y; the highest possible pro…t that the seller can achieve is
There are two cases to consider in (14): :; ng will achieve the …rst-best :
We summarize the above with the following:
is an optimal selling scheme.
As (14) suggests, the highest possible pro…t for the seller is equal to H y; the expected pro…t under uniform price H, plus an additional term that re ‡ects the expected increase in pro…t if the price could be lowered to sell also to L-consumers when the demand realization is such that doing so would raise pro…t; i.e., when (x; y) 2 (x; y) : x + y > H L y . Under a general interpersonal bundling scheme, the idea is to divide this set into regions corresponding to intervals of x + y: With bundle sizes designed to match these intervals, IB can achieve the …rst-best pro…t, as in (15), and it is therefore an optimal selling scheme. 14 Propositions 1 and 2 are complementary to each other. Proposition 2 shows that IB is an optimal selling method under (6), but it may not dominate separate selling, which is a special case of IB, and the optimal bundle might be rather complicated. By contrast, Proposition 1 shows that a simple form of IB is more pro…table than separate selling, provided that the regularity condition is satis…ed, but it does not address the issue of whether IB is an optimal selling scheme. Together, they imply that IB dominates separate selling and achieves the highest possible pro…t when (5) and (6) are both satis…ed.
While Propositions 1 and 2 shed light on the properties of IB in general, it is not explicit how they relate to the parameter values of the model and to observed marketing practices.
We next turn to simpler forms of IB that have been or can potentially be used relatively easily in practice, to gain insights on when the conditions for these results are satis…ed and how to design IB in di¤erent market environments.
IB WITH A MINIMUM OR MAXIMUM GROUP SIZE
In this section, we discuss two especially simple forms of interpersonal bundling, IBmin and IBmax. One motivation for the study of IBmin is that it is a widely observed selling practice, popularized especially on the Internet by Groupon. After studying IBmin, we also examine IBmax As it turns out, the pro…tability condition for IBmax is interestingly connected to that for IBmin. 1 4 Condition (6) is needed, essentially because the …rst-best mechanism can depend separately on x and y; while IB can only condition prices on x + y: With (6), information about x + y is su¢ cient for the implementation of the …rst best. Notice that if (x; y) :
y is empty, (6) obviously holds with i = 1 and m1 = M1: In general, while (6) holds naturally in many situations (as we illustrate later), it need not always be true.
Pro…t Advantages of IBmin
Notice that IBmin (p; q; m) is equivalent to p s = q if m a x + a y ; and to p s = p if m > b x + b y : Thus IBmin is always at least as pro…table as separate selling. To investigate when IBmin is more pro…table than separate selling and how large its pro…t advantage is, we note that, from (3) and (4), under IBmin the seller maximizes:
Let now be the highest pro…t under IBmin. Condition (A1) below provides a su¢ cient condition for
IBmin (H; L; m) is more pro…table than separate selling if (A1) holds.
Therefore, condition (5) is satis…ed, and hence IBmin is more pro…table than separate selling from Proposition 1.
Intuitively, under (A1), if p s = H; pro…t can be increased by keeping the regular price but adding a group bundle with unit price L and a minimum size that is slightly lower than b x + b y (the maximum possible total number of consumers); if p s = L; pro…t can be increased by rasing the regular price to H and adding a bundle with unit price L and a minimum size that is slightly higher than a x + a y (the minimum possible total number of consumers). (A1), which is su¢ cient but not necessary for (5) , ensures that these changes will indeed strictly increase pro…t. Condition (A1) is thus invariant to the functional form of the joint distribution of X and Y; depending only on the upper and lower limits of the support for the distribution: It holds if the H=L ratio is relatively large compared to a x =a y but small compared to b x =b y . IBmin allows the …rm to sell at the low price only if pro…t is higher under the low price-otherwise the high price will prevail-thereby assuring a higher pro…t than separate selling. 15 In many situations where group coupons are issued by sellers such as restaurants and hair salons, H could be considered as the regular price at which the seller has less uncertainty about the number of consumers. Thus the di¤erence between a y and b y tends to be relatively small: On the other hand, there might be more uncertainty about the number of consumers who will purchase at the sale price L; so the di¤erence between a x and b x tends to be relatively large. In such situations, condition (A1) is likely satis…ed. 16 To illustrate and to make explicit pro…t comparisons, consider the example below: Setting @ (H; L; m) =@m = 0; we …nd the optimal minimum bundle size as
For instance, if L = 1 and H = 2; then m = 3 and = 3: 3333 > s = 3; so IBmin increases (expected) pro…t by about 11%: 1 5 If H=L is too small, it may be optimal always to sell at p s = L; so the option to sell at alternative prices has no value. Likewise, if H=L is too large, it could be optimal always to sell at p s = H; which would then achieve the same pro…t as interpersonal bundling. 1 6 We may view IBmin as allowing the seller to experiment with a lower price that will prevail only when the number of purchasing consumers reaches a minimum size, or only when it is more pro…table than the regular price.
Several observations can be made in Example 1. First, condition (A1) is su¢ cient, but not necessary, for the pro…tability of IBmin. In Example 1, while (A1) holds for H < 2:5L;
IBmin is also pro…table when H 2 [2:5L; 2:6L):
Second, (A1) is fairly tight as a su¢ cient condition. When H 2:6L; IBmin is no longer pro…table. In this case,
2 (2:6) = 3: 9: However, for any m 2 [3: 9; 5); the expected pro…t under x + y m; in which case all sales will occur at the discounted price L; is lower than the expected pro…t under separate selling. Therefore, it is optimal for the seller not to o¤er the bundle, which is equivalent to setting a su¢ ciently large bundle size (m 5).
Third, when IBmin is pro…table, m increases in H but decreases in L: A marginal increase in m reduces the probability that the sale will occur at the low price (with a large volume) and raises the probability that the sale will occur at the high price. Thus, m ;
which balances these two e¤ects, increases with the high price and decreases with the low price.
We now turn to the question of how the advantage of IBmin, relative to separate selling, may vary with the market environment. We …rst consider how the ratio H=L; or the di¤erence between the reservation prices of the high-and low-value consumers, a¤ects the relative pro…tability of bundling.
Corollary 1 Suppose that (A1) holds and L is …xed. Then, s exhibits an inverted-U shape with respect to changes in H; …rst increasing and then decreasing, reaching maximum
is also increasing in H; and so is s : Similarly, when
Hy] dG (x; y) ; which decreases in H. When H=L is low (or high), the pro…t advantage of IBmin is low relative to separate selling, because selling at price L (or H) is often more pro…table than at price H (or L); which implies that the option to sell at one of the two prices contingent on the realizations of X + Y under IBmin has very limited value. This option becomes more valuable when H=L is at some intermediate level, implying more profound pro…t advantage of IBmin. 17 We next consider how the dispersion of X a¤ects the pro…ts under IBmin. Intuitively, when X is more dispersed, demand is more uncertain and the advantage of IBmin is larger.
The result below shows that this is indeed the case under some conditions, assuming that X and Y are independent with the (marginal) distribution of Y being F y (y) Proof. See the appendix.
Although the result seems intuitive, the comparison of pro…ts underF x (x) and F x (x) turns out to be subtle. Condition (i) ensures that p s = H under separate selling for botĥ 
Pro…tability of IBmax and the Nature of Uncertainty
We now study IBmax, (p; q; M ) ; which also weakly dominates separate selling, since it is equivalent to p s = q if M > b x + b y and to p s = p if M a x + a y : We …rst establish the pro…tability of IBmax and its pro…t advantage relative to separate selling, in parallel to and in comparison with the analysis for IBmin. We then discuss limited-quantity discount (LQD), which is closely related to IBmax, and comment on how to implement IBmax.
From (3) and (4), under IBmax the seller maximizes:
Let now be the highest pro…t under IBmax. As another application of Proposition 1, Condition (A1') below provides a su¢ cient condition for > s :
Proposition 4 IBmax is more pro…table than separate selling if (A1') holds.
Proof. From (A1'), Ha y < L (a x + a y ) : Thus there exists " 1
It follows that
Therefore, condition (5) is satis…ed, and hence IBmax dominates separate selling from Proposition 1.
Note that (A1') is more likely to hold if a y is small relative to a x and b y is large relative to b x ; that is, if Y is more dispersed than X: When the number of high-value consumers (y)
tends to be either much lower or much higher than the number of low-value consumers (x), the seller wishes to set a low price to sell to all consumers if y turns to be low, but a high price to sell only to the high-value consumers if y turns out to be high. By specifying that the low price becomes e¤ective only when the consumer group does not exceed a certain size, the seller can implement pro…table option pricing, charging a low price when demand is low and a high price when demand is high.
By contrast, the su¢ cient condition for IBmin to dominate separate selling, (A1), is more likely to hold if a y is large relative to a x and b y is small relative to b x ; that is, if X is more While IBmin has been used in the sale of many goods, IBmax does not appear common.
But a related format of IBmax, limited-quantity discount (LQD), has been used in many markets. LQD sets a low price for a limited quantity and raises the price for the additional quantity exceeding the limit. This is a popular selling strategy by airlines, hotels, stadiums, theaters, and even department stores, as discussed and analyzed in Dana (1999 Dana ( , 2001 ). 19 Dana (2001; page 650) gives the following example:
Suppose that demand will be either high or low, each with probability 1/2. Low demand consists of 50 consumers with a reservation value of $10, and high demand consists of 100 consumers with a reservation value of $12. The seller must set its prices in advance. Within his context, the following is an optimal selling strategy under zero marginal cost: print 50 tickets at a price of $10 and 50 tickets at a price of $12. This yields an expected pro…t of $800, higher than $750, the highest expected pro…t under a uniform price.
With IBmax, however, the seller can do even better in this example. Reformulating the example with the notations of our model, we have L = 10, H = 12 and (X; Y ) takes either (50,0) or (0,100) with equal probability. IBmax with regular price 12; discounted price 10;
and maximum group size M = 50 leads to an expected pro…t of $850: The seller o¤ers IBmax (12; 10; 50) to all consumers for simultaneous sign up. If the demand state is low, at most 50 consumers will sign up for group purchase and will all receive the discount price $10. If the demand state turns out to be high, more than 50 consumers will sign up, in which case the price becomes 12, and all 100 consumers pay the higher price.
Intuitively, when the group size exceeds the maximum limit M , under LQD the low price is still e¤ective for units up to M: If many of those who would purchase M units at the low price, when x + y > M; are high-value consumers (in the above example all of them are), the seller can do better with IBmax by making the low price unavailable if the group size exceeds M . On the other hand, if those who would purchase M units at the low price, when x + y > M; are mostly low-value consumers, LQD can potentially be more pro…table.
One possible reason why LQD has seen wide applications but IBmax has not is that it is more di¢ cult for a seller to commit to IBmax and to communicate it to potential buyers. However, IBmax does not seem much more di¢ cult to implement than IBmin.
For instance, a seller could announce in advance a sale price L that is e¤ective only if the number of orders it receives does not exceed M for a certain time period; and if it exceeds M ; all of those who still wish to purchase the good will need to pay the regular price H: The announcement can be made through some intermediary such as Groupon or Amazon, and the number of orders received will be kept con…dential until the time period expires (so that consumers essentially submit orders simultaneously). The goods could be theater or sports tickets, vacation packages, restaurant meals, consumer electronics, and so on. Thus, we believe that IBmax, like many other marketing innovations, will potentially …nd its pro…table applications in the marketplace after it is conceived by researchers and understood by practitioners.
INFORMATION DISSEMINATION AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Our main model has focused on the role of demand uncertainty in the pro…tability of interpersonal bundling. Demand uncertainty is a common phenomenon in many markets, and our analysis demonstrates how …rms can use this selling strategy to increase pro…t in such market environments. In this section, we discuss how a seller may incorporate two additional strategic considerations in the design of IB to enhance its pro…tability, in two variants of the main model. We shall devote our attention to IBmin, due to its high relevance to the applications we have in mind, and also for the sake of keeping the discussions concise.
Dissemination of Product Information
The existence of a seller's product may be known to some consumers but unknown to others. In order to achieve the group size to qualify for the low bundle price under IBmin, an informed potential buyer may have the incentive to transmit the sale information to other consumers. A seller should take this incentive into account in its bundle design.
To formalize this idea in a simple setting, we consider a variant of the main model by assuming that the number of H-consumers is initially a given number n 1; and each of them (i = 1; :::; n) can make an e¤ort in order to inform a set of k > 0 H-consumers who are initially unaware of the seller's product and prices. 20 De…ne set N fi : i = 1; :::; ng :
Each i 2 N succeeds in transmitting the information to the k uninformed consumers with probability i at a personal cost C ( i ) ; where C 0 ( ) > 0 with C 0 (0) ! 0; C 00 ( ) 0; and the k uninformed consumers become informed if at least one i 2 N succeeds. Thus, the number of H-consumers is potentially y =
< :
n + k with probability 1
Other Under IBmin, the seller …rst posts (p; q; m) ; after which all i 2 N simultaneously choose i : Both x and y are then realized, and possible purchases are made. For convenience, we again treat m as a continuous number, and without loss of generality, we can con…ne our search for the optimal (p; q; m) to q L < p H:
We consider a symmetric equilibrium where each i 2 N chooses the same : Given (p; q; m) ; and all other H-consumers'choice ; i chooses her i to maximize her expected surplus:
To see the trade-o¤ for i in choosing optimal i ; notice that the optimal i satis…es @U ( i j m; ) =@ i j i = = 0 in a symmetric equilibrium, which, denoting the equilibrium by (p; q; m) for any given (p; q; m), becomes:
where [F (m n) F (m n k)] is the increased probability of meeting m due to the addition of k uninformed consumers and (1 ) n 1 is the probability that other (n 1)
H-type informed consumers fail to reach the uninformed. Thus, as n goes to in…nitive, approaches zero because of the free riding problem. If n is …nite, however, rearranging the above equation gives
Thus, for a …nite …xed n, the equilibrium = (p; q; m) is positive and increases in (p q) because C 00 > 0: The choice of balances the marginal bene…t of increasing the probability of meeting the bundle size m and the marginal e¤ort cost of disseminating information.
Holding other things constant, the bundle discount (p q) has to increase with n if the seller wishes to induce the same amount of e¤ort from the informed consumers. Hence, the …rm's ability to use IBmin as an information dissemination device will be more limited when n becomes larger.
Anticipating (p; q; m) in equilibrium, the seller will choose the equilibrium bundle 
Second, IBmin can motivate consumers to transmit product information to the uninformed, or to choose i > 0 at a personal cost. In choosing m to provide this incentive, the seller balances two opposing e¤ects: while a higher m motivates the informed consumers to disseminate information, it may also diminish this incentive if the threshold is set too high.
Our next result, which provides a su¢ cient condition for higher pro…t under IBmin with the additional channel of encouraging information transmission to expand demand (i.e., in equilibrium i = > 0), refers to the following condition:
Note that (A2'), which implies the weaker condition (A2), similarly holds if H=L is in an intermediate range.
Proposition 5 Suppose that (A2') holds. Then, IBmin has higher pro…t than separate selling with > 0; p = H; and m 2 (n + a x ; n + k + b x ) :
Proof. See the appendix.
Since the discount price can be valid only if m is reached, the informed consumers have the incentive to transmit costly product information to the uninformed, hoping that more consumers will join the group purchase. As is shown in the proof for the symmetric equilibrium contained in the appendix, it is indeed optimal for each informed consumer to choose ; given that other informed consumers will do the same, and there exists an interior minimum size m . It is worth emphasizing that the optimal m is now chosen also to provide the incentive for , in addition to responding optimally to demand uncertainty.
In other words, IBmin also provides a mechanism to expand market demand.
To illustrate, consider the next example:
Example 2 Suppose that n = 2; k = 1; C ( i ) = As in Example 1, given L; m is higher for higher H: Furthermore, is also higher for higher H; directly because of the larger bundle discount (H L), and indirectly because of the higher bundle size (m ):
For tractability, our model of information dissemination has made some simplifying assumptions. In particular, our assumption that each informed consumer can transmit sale information to all uninformed consumers with some probability is restrictive. While it is possible that an informed consumer can publicize the group coupon information to all uninformed consumers through media such as facebook or an online forum, our assumption is made mainly for the tractability of analysis. We expect that the basic insights will still be valid in a more realistic setting where various numbers of uninformed consumers may become informed with di¤erent probabilities.
Another of our simplifying assumptions is that the uninformed are all H-consumers. One may wonder what would happen if some L-consumers were also in the uninformed pool.
To see this most strikingly, suppose that the uninformed are all L-consumers. Then, the incentive for the informed H-consumers to disseminate information remains unchanged, because both types of consumers are willing to buy at the discounted price L. However, the …rm's problem would need a slight modi…cation: if m is reached, the …rm would earn pro…t L (x + n + k) ; same as when all the uninformed have the high valuation; but if m is not reached, the …rm would earn pro…t Hn while the pro…t is H (n + k) when all the uninformed have the high valuation. Thus, the di¤erence when the uninformed all have the low valuation is that the …rm earns less pro…t if m is not reached. In response, the …rm would set a lower m compared to the case where all the uninformed are H-consumers. Nevertheless, the …rm will still …nd it pro…table to impose a minimum bundle size to motivate consumers to disseminate information. 21 
Price Discrimination
To obtain the group discount under IB, a consumer may need to incur transaction costs to sign up for group purchase. If H-consumers have higher time costs, they are less likely to participate. Interpersonal bundling can thus be a device for price discrimination, as in the textbook example of price discrimination through coupons. With IBmin, however, there is an additional instrument to screen the buyers: Through the choice of the minimum bundle size that may not be reached due to uncertainty, the seller can further discourage H-consumers from attempting to receive the group discount.
To illustrate, consider another variant of the main model, where the L-consumers have no cost to participate in group purchase, but the H-consumers incur a transaction cost t to do so. Assume that t is distributed on
The number of L-consumers is again x with cumulative distribution function F (x) ; while the mass of H-consumers is normalized to 1. Under separate selling,
As in the main model, the game under IBmin proceeds as follows: First, the seller o¤ers In order to analyze price discrimination under alternative forms of IBmin, we further assume that consumers can sign up for group purchase possibly in two periods, 1, or 2.
(Neither the seller nor consumers discount time.) Under the simultaneous format, at the beginning of period 2 the seller does not reveal how many consumers signed up in the …rst 2 1 The analysis can also be properly modi…ed to deal with the more general case where the uniformed were a mix of the two types of consumers, and 2 [0; 1] were the portion of the H-consumers in the uninformed pool. It can be shown that the result (Proposition 5) would be qualitatively similar.
period, whereas under the sequential format the …rm does. Hence, with the former all consumers e¤ectively make sign-up decisions simultaneously, whereas with the latter they make sign-up decisions sequentially.
Simultaneous Format
In this case, an H-consumer, if she wishes to participate, needs to incur t before it becomes known how many L-consumers have joined group purchase, or what the realization of x is (it is optimal for all L-consumers to sign up for group coupon since they incur no sign-up cost). Suppose that there is some t 2 [0; t] that solves
Then, there will be an equilibrium where all L-consumers sign up for group purchase, and an H-consumer will sign up if and only if t t : 22 We shall focus on this equilibrium. 23
Rearranging (19), we obtain
The seller's problem is, with t = t (p; q; m) ; to maximize
The solution to (21) de…nes the equilibrium (p ; q ; m ) :
With regular price p and discounted bundle price q, an H-consumer may nevertheless prefer to purchase at p; because she incurs t for group purchase and she may lose t without receiving the bundle discount if m is not reached. Hence, a higher m will reduce the incentive of an H-consumer to engage in group purchase. IBmin may thus price discriminate more e¤ectively both than traditional coupons and than traditional mixed bundling. A higher m; however, can hurt the seller if the sales to the L-consumers do not materialize.
Notice that any q below L will lower the seller's pro…t when the good is sold at a discount and will also make participating in group purchase more attractive to the H-consumers.
Thus it is optimal for q = L: On the other hand, a higher p may increase the pro…t from the H-consumers paying p but makes the bundle discount more attractive. Consequently, the optimal p is determined jointly with m:
Again denote the seller's equilibrium pro…t under IBmin by : To derive a su¢ cient condition under which > s ; we utilize the condition below
Since p H; part (i) in (A3) ensures that some H-consumers will not incur t for the bundle discount, and, from (21),
small enough " > 0 (i.e., m is slightly below b x + (t ), we have, from (21):
where the last inequality above holds because H (t ) < L 
Sequential Format
Now consider the sequential format: Since an L-consumer has no cost to sign up, it is optimal for her to do so in the …rst period. Therefore in equilibrium all L-consumers sign up in period 1 and their number is then publicly known.
Next consider the sign-up decision of H-consumers, for whom it is optimal to wait until the beginning of period 2 to make the choice. 24 Suppose for a moment that, in equilibrium, depending on the realization of x, there exists a cuto¤ value t (x) such that only Hconsumers with t t will sign up for group purchase. Given such a strategy by other consumers, an H-consumer with sign-up cost t chooses to sign up only if this leads to a (weakly) higher surplus for her and if a group discount is expected to be o¤ered:
Hence the marginal H-consumer has t = p q. It follows that, if x x, it is optimal for any H-consumer with t t to sign up given that the others will do the same, where
and the group size will be reached. Therefore, under the sequential format, there is indeed an equilibrium, where the seller chooses (p; q; m) optimally, L-consumers sign up in the …rst period, and: (i) if x x; then H-consumers with t t will sign up in the second period and m will be reached, so that group participants will pay discounted price q while non-participants (H-consumers with t > t ) will pay regular price p; (ii) if x <x; no H-consumers will sign up and only regular price p is available. 25
Comparing (22) with (20), we have t > t : That is, more H-consumers will sign up for group purchase under the sequential than under the simultaneous format of IBmin. This implies that, for the same bundle, group purchases will occur more often under the sequential format. The intuition behind this …nding, as in Hu, Shi, and Wu (2013), is that the sequential format removes the uncertainty faced by period-2 consumers about the number of participating consumers in period 1, which makes period-2 consumers more willing to sign up. Although our model and analysis di¤er from those in Hu, Shi, and Wu (2013), 26 our …nding supports their conclusion that the sequential group-buying mechanism will lead to higher deal success rates. While this implies that a seller would prefer the sequential format if, as they assume, it aims to maximize the deal success rates, in our model the seller, whose objective is to maximize pro…t, may actually prefer the simultaneous format.
To see that pro…t can be higher under simultaneous than under sequential IBmin, we notice that the seller's pro…t function for the sequential format can be obtained by using the pro…t expression for the simultaneous format in (21) but replacing t with t :
While a complete comparison of pro…ts under the two formats is rather complicated and 2 5 Potentially there can also be an equilibrium in which some of the H-consumers with low t sign up in the …rst period, which may enhance the probability of a discrete bene…t of the group discount. In the appendix, we argue that this equilibrium, when it exists, has qualitatively similar properties as the equilibrium here. 2 6 Among other di¤erences, in their group-buying mechanisms consumers have heterogenous valuations but identical participation costs, whereas in our model high-value consumers di¤er in participation costs but have identical valuation.
beyond the scope of our paper, we demonstrate that pro…t can be higher in the simultaneous format with the following example: Table 2 compares equilibrium simultaneous and sequential IBmin, denoted with superscripts and ; respectively. Table 2 Simultaneous Format Sequential Format Example 3 makes it clear that a pro…t-maximizing seller may prefer the simultaneous over the sequential format. This is because the seller wishes to price discriminate when using IBmin, and, unlike the sequential format, the simultaneous format does not remove uncertainty for the H-consumers, thereby discouraging them from signing up to obtain the group discount.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has conducted a strategic analysis of interpersonal bundling. As a mechanism for option pricing under demand uncertainty, interpersonal bundling will often dominate separate selling with just one or two bundle size intervals, and it is optimal among all selling mechanisms under a plausible su¢ cient condition. The pro…tability conditions of interpersonal bundling with a minimum or maximum group size exhibit interesting similarities and di¤erences: each is likely pro…table when the ratio of reservation prices of the two consumer types (H=L) is within some intermediate range, and each's pro…t advantage (relative to separate selling) tends to be an inverted-U function of H=L; but IBmin (respectively, IBmax) tends to be more pro…table when the number of low-value (respectively, high-value) consumers is more dispersed. Furthermore, the pro…tability of IBmin will be enhanced if the incentive to qualify for group purchase motivates buyers to disseminate product information, and if more high-value consumers can be induced to pay the regular instead of the discounted price.
Like other selling formats, interpersonal bundling can achieve its potential bene…ts for the seller only if it is properly implemented. In particular, losses may occur if the bundle discount under group purchase is too big. For example, when a restaurant o¤ers a group coupon for 70% o¤ its regular price, it could be unwisely pricing below marginal cost. 27 While many businesses have pro…ted from o¤ering IBmin on the Internet, there have also been media reports about how a merchant is hurt by its deep group discount through
Groupon and other "social buying" intermediaries. 28 Part of the problem is a potential con ‡ict in incentives: even though the seller should use the advertised deal to maximize its pro…t, an intermediary like Groupon bene…ts from a higher deal success rate. However, it need not be in the best interests of the sellers (and, in the long run, also their Internet intermediaries such as Groupon) to focus only on deal success rates. As our theory suggests, the seller's pro…t is sometimes higher when the deal is o¤--if the realized number of lowvalue consumers is not high. 29 And, it would be even worse for sellers if below-cost group sale prices are used to boost deal success rates.
We have studied monopoly interpersonal bundling in this paper. It would be desirable for future research to analyze interpersonal bundling by competing …rms. The pro…tability of this selling strategy, and its potential adoption by a …rm, may then depend on competitive conditions, possibly also including considerations such as product di¤erentiation. For tractability, our model has made some restrictive assumptions, such as that there are only two types of consumers. It would be desirable for future research to extend the analysis to more general settings. While our analysis has demonstrated the pro…tability of general bundle menus, it remains to be seen when they will be implemented by innovative …rms.
The simple form of a maximum bundle size, though, can perhaps easily …nd its pro…table applications in the Internet market. It follows from (18) that > 0:
Alternative Equilibrium under Sequential IBmin in Section 4.2
We argue below that at the alternative equilibrium (see footnote 25), the H-consumers who join group purchase and the seller's optimal choice of (p; q; m) are the same as those in the equilibrium in Section 4.2 under the sequential format, even though some of the group-buying H-consumers sign up in period 1 here.
Consider a potential equilibrium where all L-and some H-consumers with cost t t 0 sign up in the …rst period and the H-consumers with cost t 2 (t 0 ; t (x)] sign up in the second period. Given an equilibrium cuto¤ value t ; a consumer with t > t 0 will choose to sign up in the second period if H q t H p and
The cuto¤ values of t and x are thus identical to those in condition (22) on p. 29. Moreover, there exists t 0 > 0 such that H-type consumers with t t 0 optimally sign up in the …rst period. This is because the expected bene…t of an early sign-up, which is discount (H L) multiplied by the expected increase in the probability of reaching the minimum bundle size, is a positive constant and thus, for a su¢ ciently low t; there exists a cuto¤ t 0 2 (t; t) such that the consumer with t = t 0 is indi¤erent between signing up in …rst period or not doing so. Accordingly, the …rm will o¤er the optimal (p; q; m) that maximizes (23) on p.30.
Therefore, if we compare the equilibrium discussed here with the one in Section 4.2 under sequential format, the cuto¤ value t for the marginal H-consumer who join group purchase (t and t , respectively) and the optimal (p; q; m) are characterized by the same set of equations, even though some of the group-buying H-consumers sign up in period 1 here.
